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The Subject of Research: Cyberspace as a Precondition of 
Application of Law in Mulitcentric Legal System [1]
The  emergence  of  unified  European  network  sustaining  the 
communication between courts might be perceived as a precondition for the 
existence and smooth evolution of the so called European legal area.
The  concept  of  cyberspace  as  a  vehicle  for  communication  between 
different judicial actors operating within European legal environment will 
enable us to formulate two fundamental assumptions:
Firstly, the underlying premises of the European Court of Justice while 
adjudicating  along with art  234  ECT require  the  existence  of  a  network 
composed  out  of  multi-level  horizontal  providers,  such  as  ECJ,  EChR, 
Constitutional Courts of Member States (1-st level), Courts of last instance 
according  to  art.  234  ECT  point  3  (2-nd  level),  other  Domestic  Courts 
according to art. 234 ECT point 2 (3-rd level).
Secondly, the standard of states’ liability for judicial error (both in EC law 
and in Strasbourg case law) will push member states toward participation 
of  their  courts  within  such  a  network  in  order  to  prevent  and  avoid 
potential liability for breach of EC law or the EChR. This will additionally 
strengthen the impact of some characteristic features of Cyberspace upon 
European legal Area.
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The Outline of the Theory of Multicentric System of Law [2]
According to  Ernst  Wolfgang Böckenförde  as  far  as  political  and legal 
development  in  European integration  is  concerned,  we  are  in  a  state  of 
transition, where traditional dogmatic categories and structures capture the 
changing realities  only  in  part  or  not  at  all.1 Those  traditional  dogmatic 
categories are very often (at least at the level of European law) associated 
with normativism, and traditional theory of law or jurisprudence.
Concepts such as “autonomous legal order” or ‘independent legal system’ 
will  always  lead  back  to  equally  unclear  concepts  such as  ‘independent 
source of effectiveness’  of a legal order.  Additionally the European legal 
area being a ‘fluid system’ may ‘hardly be described with rigid terms and 
notions.  The  contemporary  legal  theory  begins  gradually  to  accept  non-
unitarian character of law. In order to describe the system, new army of 
metaphors is marching.
The phenomena of the European legal area is being called multicentrism 
(at least in Polish literature on the subject) as proposed by E. Łętowska.2 The 
term has also been adopted by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, according 
to  which  it  refers  to  “coexistence  of  different  legal  rules  produced  by 
different  law-making  bodies  and  applied  by  various  courts’  structures” 
(Polish CT K18/04, 11.05.2005).
Contemporary  dynamism of  integration  requires  the  acceptance  of  the 
fact that the authorities who are external to national authorities may in a 
binding or persuasive way make decisions concerning the application and 
interpretation of law. These decisions are effective on the territory of the 
state. Due to the process of European integration there exists one legal order 
of a particular Member State, still the system is of a multicentric character, 
where  the  division  of  competences  quoad  usum  between  national  and 
Community authorities  takes place.  The multicentrism of  legal  system is 
discernible also within the perspective of the ratification of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In the sphere of 
human rights there is a co-existence and co-operation of norms originating 
1 E. W. Böckenförde (1999)., Staat, Nation, Europa, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, p. 8.
2 E. Łętowska (2005)., Multicentryczność współczesnego systemu prawa i jej konsekwencje, 
Państwo i Prawo, 4, 3 – 10.
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from the national and conventional law. Accordingly, there is a division of 
competences between the Tribunal in Strasbourg, ECJ and national courts.
The  advocates  of  multicentric,  polycentric  or  multi-level  model  of  law 
underline that the linear relations among legal rules have been replaced by 
circular or looped hierarchy of legal norms. A looped hierarchy is defined 
as  an  interaction  among  various  levels  or  centers  (which  are  discerned 
within the hierarchical order) in which the highest level directs back to the 
lowest level and influences it while at the same time the highest level is 
determined somehow by the lowest one.
Such  system  forms  a  total  unity  of  legal  norms  among  which  exists 
specific interaction of a correlative character. The system is specified with a 
relative teleological unity while as one norm forms an autonomous aim, the 
other norms serve towards its realization.
Those phenomena in a particular way influence the process of application 
of law by courts. It seems that here the most serious problems are linked to 
the  obligation  of  a  national  judge  to  apply  legal  norms  of  a  national, 
Community  and international  origin, to use standards,  rules and principles 
of supranational and international character. Hence, the judge should be able 
to identify a required standard, according to which it is necessary to decide a 
given case. Moreover, he or she should be able to solve a conflict among the 
conflicting  rules  or  standards,  which  might  be  perceived  as  a  form  of 
discretional “metaregulation”.  Undoubtedly the process is additionally being 
complicated  by  unclear,  questionable  and  politically  “sensitive”  liaisons, 
entanglements  and  relations  of  dependence  between  national  law  and 
Community  law,  resulting with competence  disputes  among  national  and 
Community courts.
The relationship between multicentric judicial structure and state liability 
doctrine has been explained by the ECJ’s 2003 decision in Köbler v. Republic  
of Austria, (Case C-224/01 E.C.R. I-10239). In this ruling ECJ proclaimed that 
a  Member  State  may be liable  in  damages for  a  national  court’s  serious 
misapplication of EC law. The assumption that the Kobler case clarified the 
relationship  between  ECJ  and  national  courts,  especially  courts  of  last 
instance, is doubtful. On one hand decisions of national supreme courts can 
render the State liable for breach of Community law. On the other hand the 
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operation of this principle in practice will be elaborated upon by the ECJ on 
a case-by-case basis.
The approach presented in Kobler has been repeated and reinforced in the 
Traghetti case (June 2006), where any limitation of State liability on the part 
of  the  court  has  been  found  as  contrary  to  Community  law  if  such  a 
limitation  were  to  lead  to  exclusion  of  liability  of  the  Member  State 
concerned in other cases where a manifest infringement of the applicable 
law was committed.
Consequently,  the  multicentric  system  might  be  characterized  by  two 
paradoxes:
Firstly, it is devastating for the national legal order to ask a first instance 
court to sit in judgment on a court of last instance. Such an attitude of ECJ 
might lead to some unexpected results.  In particular,  there is  a  question 
about impartiality required by Article 6 of the ECHR. This problem may 
result with the potential conflict between Luxemburg and Strasbourg.
Secondly,  traditional,  hierarchical  structure  of  national  courts  within 
member states is melting. From the Luxemburg’s perspective, those structures 
are  being  transformed  into  some  levels  or  layers  composed  out  of: 
Constitutional  Courts  (first  level),  Highest  courts  (courts  of  last  instance, 
ending the procedure, so the structure is fluid, because they vary from case to 
case)-second level, lower courts-the third level. Additionally one may observe 
that imposition of State liability for judicial acts would be likely to lead to the 
ECJ’s  decisions  on  whether  a  national  supreme  court  had acted  manifestly 
wrongly.  Lower level national  courts may be unwilling to find that superior 
national courts have acted in that way. They might therefore look to the ECJ to 
make the final judgment. This will lead to potential conflict within presumably 
cooperative institutional environment.  As a result the ECJ might be placed in 
potential conflict with national supreme courts in unexpected way.
From this perspective we come to the conclusion that there emerges a new 
(horizontal)  division  of  functions  between ECJ  and EChR.  ECJ  is  apt  to 
promote  integration  and the  development  of  Multicentrism as  a  gain  in 
itself, whereas EChR is going to concentrate on the protection of rights of 
individuals. Although the Court of Human Rights usually does not interfere 
with any finding of a national court on the ground of unfairness, there is 
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one precedent. It is the case of Dulaurans v France16 decided in March 2000, 
where a finding of the French Court of Cassation, which left undecided one 
of the claims of the applicant,  was considered as manifestly wrong. This 
decision is certainly a step in the right direction. As one of judges of EChR, 
Loukis Loucaides emphasizes, any manifestly wrong finding or judgement 
of a national court, even though not 'arbitrary', is at the same time an unfair 
finding which can, for that matter, be reviewed by the Strasbourg Court on 
the basis of a complaint in respect of a breach of the right to a fair trial.  In 
our opinion it might be expected that ECJ’s case law will tend sooner or 
later towards this direction.
The existence of those paradoxes may lead to the conclusion that the idea 
that it is possible for the “correct” answer to be reached in Community law 
cases,  whilst  intellectually  attractive,  raises  serious  practical  doubts. 
Procedural efficiency and legal certainty are principles whose value should 
not be forgotten. Such an assumption may provoke two different responses.
Some commentators emphasize the fact that law within multicentric  or 
multilevel system can not be recognize as such (Sir Neil MacCormick). They 
openly  speak,  as  Alexander  Somek  does,  about  “inexplicable  law  in 
Europe”: In the context of search for the new paradigm of supranationality 
in law it endorses weak or strong scepticism. Just to quote, Somek writes:
“There is a beautifully dark side to this. It should be born in mind that this 
situation is symbolism for it assumes that the law, at any rate of the level of 
elaboration  by  high  judicial  tribunals,  is  universally  inexplicable.  The 
authority on which the hierarchy is built has no medium to express itself. 
This  is  the  hidden  greatness  of  the  strategy  of  privatization.  It  has  no 
reasonable sphere of application. It is merely symbolic. It is a symbol for the 
hope that  there is  an excuse for  the general  fact  that  inexplicable  law is 
purported to be known in decisions.”3
If  law is inexplicable,  are we destined to await  (with hope or  anxiety) 
forthcoming judgments of ECJ and National Supreme Courts? Are we left 
with nothing “on the desert of the realm of multicentric chaos?”.
The simple answer to this is, yes we are at least to some degree, though 
3 Somek,  A.  (2006).,  Inexplicable  Law:  Legality’s  Adventure  in  Europe,  Retrieved  from 
October 10, 2006, from www.law.uiowa.edu/faculty/workingpapers.php.
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we  may  try  to  apply  different  analytical  tools  in  order  to  predict  and 
optimize application of law within the multicentric legal system.
Traditional legal theory assumes that we are living in a world where legal 
rules are commonly known, at least by judges, who operate within costless, 
abundant environment.
In other words,  it assumes that application of law, (adjudication) takes 
place within a world untouched by scarcity of resources. If we accepted the 
fact,  that  both,  adjudication  and  potential  judicial  errors  are  expensive, 
where  workable  judicial  system  requires  optimal  allocation  of  judicial 
resources,  than  we may  end up with  the  believe,  that  maybe  economic 
analysis  of  law  provides  with  an  adequate  set  of  instruments  and 
explanatory tools and it may enable one to analyze adjudication within the 
multicentric legal environment from a quite new and fresh perspective.
Bound Rationality,
Cyberspace and the Scope of Multicentrism [3]
Not deficiency but abundance and redundancy of legal resources may be 
regarded as a main source of potential problems with and within European 
Legal Area (ELA).
The necessary pre-condition for the existence and proper functioning of 
ELR  may  be  identified  with  and  referred  to  the  flow  of  information. 
Otherwise co evolution would not become a feasible option. Moreover, it 
must be pointed out that a process of selection of the information is also 
crucial for the social development. The contemporary model of adjudication 
should  include  many  sources  of  information  as  well  as  multicentric 
structure  of  the  institutional  framework  of  decision  –  making  process. 
Therefore,  in order to avoid liability  for  judicial  error,  the courts  should 
improve  the  communication  and  flow  of  information  concerning  the 
content  of  given  sentences,  their  reasons  and  different  opinions  on 
interpretation.4 It  seems  a  demanding  requirement  as  there  is  a  large 
number of information and a limited access to it.5
In  the  above-presented  context  it  is  necessary  to  use  some  modern 
4 Susskind, R, (1987)., Expert Systems in Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 41-49.
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instruments for indirect, mediated interaction within which the participants 
are  not  oriented  towards  communicating  with  particular  persons,  but 
within which the produced and received material is directed towards an 
audience, indefinite in its scope.6
Internet is a tool used for sending and receiving information. It is also an 
instrument for facilitating interpersonal communication and in result for an 
improvement of the social ability of an individual.7 Within the multicentric 
character  of  the  system  of  law,  net-organization  of  the  Internet  should 
facilitate  the  process  of  transmission  of  the  important  information  – 
decisions and other actions made by the entities applying the law, courts in 
particular. Cyberspace seems to form a new medium – a global agora, scene 
or platform that is used not only for horizontal and vertical communication 
among particular courts but it is also a place for judicial discourse.8
Castells’  theory  deals  with  the  network  construction  of  society  and 
network conception of reality. Internet is perceived not only as a new source 
of values and interests but also as a means for realization of one’s claims 
and demands.  In  Castells’  view the  essence  of  contemporary  society are 
social  networks,  with  their  important  social  structures  and  actions 
organized around electronically  transformed data.9 This  critical  theory of 
society should be supplemented with a new understanding of the role of 
state  and law in creating  (shaping)  legal  relations  and the  protection  of 
rights of individuals and whole society. The influence computer technology 
on social life is not of a shallow character but results in deep changes in 
many aspects of life, legal sphere including.
The  functioning  of  information  or  network  society  makes  it  possible  to 
broaden  the existing discoursive  formation  of public opinion. Therefore,  it 
may be observed that the evolutions tends towards a deliberative model of 
5 Wróblewski,  J.  (1982).,  Operative  Models  of  Legal  Systems.  In:  C.  Ciampi  (ed.),  Artificial  
Intelligence  and  Legal  Information  Systems,  Amsterdam-New York-Oxford:  North  Holland 
Publ.; idem (1978).,  Axiological  Problems of  Legal Informatics.  In: F. Kaulbach, W. Krawietz 
(ed.), Recht und Gesellschaft.Festschrift für Helmut Schelsky, Berlin: Duncker&Humblot.
6 Thompson, J. B. (2001)., Media i nowoczesność, Wrocław: Astrum, p. 90–91.
7 Kreisler, H. (2006)., Identity and Change in the Network Society: Conversation with Manuel 
Castells. Retrieved November 5, 2006, from http://globetrotter.berkley.edu/people/Castells/
castells-con0.html. 
8 Castells, M. (2001).,  The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business, Society,  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p 11-40.
9 Ibidem p. 80-157.
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politics  or  even  contractual  conceptions  and  Kantian  liberalism.  R.  Alexy 
points  out that  within the contemporary  states  respecting  the rule of  law, 
communicational  integration became a correlated of democratic  institutions 
and rules governing democratic society.10 The communicational vision of the 
contemporary  society  may serve  as a means  for  realizing  such a situation 
when  a  community  of  ideas  is  not  an  artificial  and  mechanically  forced 
community  but  rather  a  community  based  in  an  inner  authentic  reality 
comprising of understanding and acceptance of a given line of arguments.
A  sphere  where  the  exchange  of  opinions  and  thoughts  is  virtually 
unlimited –  apart  from the  requirements  of  practical  rationality  and the 
ethics of discourse – is the very cyberspace. There, any arguments may be 
presented freely,  sincerely and honestly – without any fear of a possible 
derision or danger.  Therefore,  these conditions are equal to the so-called 
requirements of importance, presented by Habermas. Unlike a  prima facie  
statements, it seems that such a discourse may be close to the ideal situation 
of  a  speech.  The medium of  Internet  plays  a  significant  role  within  the 
multicentrism  of  a  legal  system  where  discoursed  are  becoming 
multicultural,  looped  and  enriched  with  many  motives.  Therefore  it  is 
crucial to have an opportunity of passing the information on the content of 
the discourses, to have a possibility of participation and to have an open 
and  quick  presentation  of  one’s  arguments  on  a  universal  forum.  The 
discourses  may  be  characterized  in  a  twofold  way:  firstly,  they  are 
heterogeneous  when  dealing  with  intimate,  private,  inner  affairs,  and 
secondly,  they  are  homogeneous  when  dealing  with,  for  instance,  the 
European affairs.
As  far  as  the  flow  of  information  among  different  decision  centres  is 
concerned,  there  is no limitation  of time and space  that  resulted from the 
necessity to follow sometimes far distances in order to get the information on 
interpretative statement (for instance,  from the European Courts of Justice) 
that must be taken into consideration  within  its argumentation  process  by 
domestic  courts  (for  instance,  in Riga).  One may conclude that  Internet  is 
medium;  medium  is  communication;  communication  is  information; 
10 Alexy, R.  (1995).,  Recht Vernunft,  Diskurs. Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie,  Frankfurt am 
Main:  Suhrkamp,  passim;  Paroussis,  M.  (1995).,  Theorie  des juristischen Diskurses:  eine 
institutionelle Epistemologie des Rechts, Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, passim.
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information is in the net.11
The  computer  technology  facilitates  a  quicker  understanding  and 
consolidation of transmitted information in the memory of receivers; while 
the creation of data bases serves to find solutions to many social problems, 
including legal problems, in less time.12 Using the metaphor of information 
highway  of  B.  Gates,13 contemporary  lawyer  should  be  prepared  for 
gathering large amount of information, such as data concerning particular 
judicial decisions that should be transformed and used within his/her own 
interpretation process, as quickly and effectively as possible. Otherwise, the 
lawyer  is  exposed  to  an  ignorance  of  the  latest  directions  of  judicial 
decisions, or even an ignorance of law, and this in consequence may result 
in loosing of the given case,  and as far  as judicial  decisions  of  domestic 
courts are concerned, the above result may lead to state liability.
Conclusion [4]
Multicentric legal system forms a total unity of legal norms among which 
specific interaction of a correlative character exists. The system is specified 
with a relative teleological unity while as one norm forms an autonomous 
aim; the other norms serve towards its realization. Those phenomena in a 
particular  way  influence  the  process  of  application  of  law  by  courts.  It 
seems  that  within  this  sphere  the  gravest  problems  are  linked  to  the 
obligation  of  a  national  judge  to  apply  legal  norms  of  a  national, 
Community and international origin, to use standards, rules and principles 
of supranational and international character.
Within the context of multicentrism of legal system the notion formulated 
by  Castells  on  the  role  of  the  computer  networks  may  play  within  the 
process of organization of local, or rather local-global communities, seems 
insightful.  According  to  Castells  the  old  statement  “think  globally,  act 
locally” should be replaced by its opposite.
11 Goban-Klas, T. (2005), Społeczeństwo masowe, informacyjne, sieciowe czy medialne?, Ethos, 
1-2,  p.  105;  McLuhan,  M.  (2004),  Zrozumieć  media.  Przedłużenie  człowieka,  Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwa Naukowo-Technicze, p. 39-53.
12 See Aakhus, M. (2002), Modeling reconstruction in groupware technology. In: F. H. van Eemeren 
(ed.), Advances in Pragma-Dialectics. Amsterdam – Newport, Sic Sat-Vale Press, p. 121 – 136.
13 See Gates, B. (1997), Information and Our Interactive Future. In: M. D. Ermann, M. B. Williams, 
M. S. Schauf (ed.), Computers, Ethics and Society, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
p. 114-122.
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